Home >> East Asia >> North & South Korea Email Print North Korean Conundrums Continues Rajaram Panda, Ph.D. - 7/30/2009 The recent bellicosity unleashed by Kim Jong Il regime of North Korea by conducting underground nuclear test and the audacity of announcing the world that more such successive tests are in the pipeline sends shivers through the spine of neighbouring countries of Northeast Asia such as South Korea and Japan. China as the host of the Six-Party talks has not given up hope on the SPT, though at the moment Pyongyang has walked out of the forum.
As a volte face, now Pyongyang agrees to talk only to the US about the rising tension over its nuclear weapons programme. This was a marked shift in tactics after months of ratcheting up foreign anxieties with nuclear test and missile launches. Surprising as it may be, this change in stance came only days after the North Korean leadership traded jibes with US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at a regional summit in Thailand. It said she was “by no means intelligent” and looked like a schoolgirl or a pensioner going shopping, after she compared it to a group of “small children”.
North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations argues that the six-party talks are dead for ever, categorically saying that “we will never participate in the six-party talks again. Never again.” He further argues that North Korea is the only one of the six without nuclear access. The US, China and Russia have nuclear capability, and Japan and South Korea are under the protection of the US. The argument, therefore, is that there is only country with nuclear vacancy in the region. Pyongyang feels defenceless and possessing nuclear deterrent is therefore perceived to be their legitimate option. Yet, despite Pyongyang’s sudden invite to Washington, the deadlock is likely to continue on the issue of participation in the talks. Any meaningful talks seem therefore unlikely soon.
Critics argue that this may be a ploy on Pyongyang’s part to extract some aid and money from the US to survive for a year and build more “defensive” weapons. If the US agrees to the bilateral talks, North Korea can sell the idea to its people that the US is afraid of its military. If the US thinks in the negative, Pyongyang can proclaim to the world that the US wants to start a war in the Korean peninsula. The most likely scenario seems to be to dragging on the issue with no real action of any form to curtail the atomic and missile programs of North Korea
Resolution 1874
Japan is equally concerned as its own security becomes more vulnerable. To rein in Pyongyang, it has sought enhanced sanctions through the UN Security Council resolution to make the North see reason. The Obama administration has demonstrated its ineffectiveness to punish Pyongyang. As regards Russia, it is geographically a bit far from the Korean peninsula. Its main interests are non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and want a de-nuclearised North Korea. It is keen to strengthen the role of the IAEA, though North Korea has asked the IAEA members to leave the country.
In order to prevent nuclear weapons exports by North Korea, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution No. 1874 on 12 June banning such exports and provided the UN member states the means of enforcing the new restrictions. Resolution 1874 calls upon countries to inspect North Korean cargos on the high seas, but only “with the consent of the flag State”, in this case North Korea. If Pyongyang refuses, a member state can, with the term of the resolution, direct the vessel to an appropriate convenient port for inspection by local officials. If Pyongyang refuses to divert the ship, the resolution contemplates the filing of a report to a UN committee.
Kang Nam 1 and link with Myanmar
Around this time, the Kang Nam 1, a North Korea tramp freighter, was on the high seas tailed by a team of American destroyers and submarines and watched by reconnaissance satellites and aircraft. The USS John S. McCain in the South China Sea shadowed the slow-moving North Korean freighter. On board, its cargo was suspected to be plutonium pellets, missile parts or semi-ripe melons. Washington wanted to know what was in the rusty ship’s hold. According to South Korean intelligence reports, the ship’s mission appeared to be related to a Myanmar nuclear program and also carried Scud-type missiles.
It was suspected that the Kang Nam 1 was carrying weapons and was approaching Myanmar. Though Resolution 1874 allowed states to seize and dispose off illicit weapons, the US diplomats touted these steps as innovative, robust and unprecedented. However, any US action against the Kang Nam 1 could have evoked sharp response from Pyongyang. There lied the danger how other countries would have reacted.
Why was the sudden interest in this particular vessel Kang Nam 1? It was believed that Kang Nam 1 was a repeat offender and known to have carried proliferation materials. The ship was presumed to have been carrying something illicit given its past history. If Kang Nam 1 was allowed to sail to its destination, suspected to be Myanmar, India would have been concerned too of such activities going on in its neighbourhood. Though the real intentions of the vessel were not clear, for unknown reason, Kang Nam I returned to the North Korean shore, thereby putting to all speculations to an abrupt halt. The reason for its return remained a mystery. As per the commander of the US Pacific Command, air and sea traffic between the two countries could be used to transfer nuclear technology from one isolated regime to another.
In the meantime, the Japanese police arrested three men over an alleged attempt to send high-tech arms-making equipment to Myanmar at the behest of North Korean agents. This deepened suspicions that Pyongyang was helping to arm Myanmar’s military junta. The three arrested men – a North Korean citizen and two Japanese – had attempted to ship to Myanmar a magnetometer, a device used to measure the strength of magnetic fields. Export of “dual use” devices is restricted under Japanese law because they are employed in the manufacture of ballistic missiles.
Myanmar and North Korea ended diplomatic relations in 1983 after a bungled assassination attempt by North Korean agents killed 20 people in Myanmar. But in recent years, they are believed to be cooperating in a number of areas, including weapons supplies. Myanmar’s exiles have published photographs of vast network of underground tunnels and bunkers outside Myanmar’s jungle capital, Naypyidaw, built with help from North Korean engineers. Like North Korea’s leaders, the military junta lives in constant fear of attack by a western power.
According to Khin Maung Win, executive director of the Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma, a military team of Myanmar traveled to Russia for training in nuclear technology. Win further says that the junta entered into a contract with Russia for a small nuclear reactor but the deal fell through when the junta failed to pay the money.
Though Kang Nam 1 made steady progress down the coast of China, Myanmar government issued a statement denying that the vessel was heading to Myanmar’s coast. On the other hand, Myanmar claimed that it was expecting another North Korean vessel MV Dumangang, a cargo vessel carrying rice from India. Myanmar is suspected to be getting significant quantities of conventional weapons from North Korea in the past few years, and also getting help in building a sophisticated complex of tunnels and bunkers for its military rulers. Therefore, it was difficult to accept the initial denials by Myanmar that Kang Nam 1 was not heading towards its ports.
Two interesting developments: First, Burma’s Censorship Board restricted reportage on the progress of the North Korean vessel. Second, the vessel might have been forced to refuel in Singapore, in which case the Singaporean authorities would have faced a dilemma over whether to try to inspect its cargo. North Korea had warned it would view such inspection as an act of war.
Scernarios
The most frightening and worst-case scenario seems to be North Korea provides Myanmar nuclear technology. Hillary Clinton said in Thailand that such a technology exchange would be a threat to its allies as well as contribute to the destabilization of the region. Not only North Korea suspected of supplying Myanmar with small-caliber weapons and ammunitions, but also suspected of helping Myanmar pursue a nuclear weapons program.
The other possible dimension to this is whether the US would reexamine its role as a “bad cop” and set the stage for the “good cops” – China, India and ASEAN – to make the junta see reason. But then the “good cops” do not share a common agenda. While Myanmar’s neighbours would opt for engagement, China would protect its own interests of maintaining extensive trade relations and uses it as a backdoor to the Bay of Bengal. As regards India, it sells arms to the junta as a counterpoint to China’s influence. The ASEAN members prefer to stick to their guiding principle of “noninterference” and pursuit of trade and investment. Such a picture not only undermines the US policy of isolation and sanctions but provides fertile ground for Myanmar to do its own business with North Korea the way it likes.
Security planners in India ought to be seized of the matter that sophisticated weapons reaching Myanmar make the Northeastern region more vulnerable. Since India has diplomatic relations with both Myanmar and North Korea, the government needs to talk with the leaders of both countries to prevent any such eventuality.
Rajaram Panda, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, a premier think tank on security and defence related issues, in India.
|
|